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NOTES 
Statutory and Common Law Considerations in Defining the 
Tort Liability of Public Employee Unions to Private Citi-
zens for Damages Inflicted by IDegal Strikes 
Despite their nearly universal prohibition, 1 strikes by public em-
1. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); United Steelworkers v. 
University of Ala., 599 F.2d 56, 61 (5th Cir. 1979); United Fedn. of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 
325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1971) (per curiam); Arizona Bd. of Regents v. Communications 
Workers, [1969-1970) Lab. Cas. (CCR) 67,095 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 1969); Fort Smith v. Arkansas 
State Council, 245 Ark. 409,433 S.W.2d 153 (1968); Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 lli.2d 567, 
207 N.E.2d 427 (1965); City of Pana v. Crowe, 57 ill. 2d 5447, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974); Ander-
son Fedn. of Teachers v. School City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558, 254 N.E.2d 329 (1970), cert. 
denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970); Board of Educ. v. New Jersey Educ. Assn., 53 N.J. 29, 247 A.2d 
867 (1968); City of Alcoa v. Electrical Workers Local Union 760, 203 Tenn. 12, 308 S.W.2d 476 
(1957). 
Statutory prohibitions include 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(7)(A) (Supp. II 1978) (strike by federal 
employees is unfair labor practice); 18 U.S.C. § 1918(3) (1976) (criminal penalties for strike by 
federal employees); ALA. CODE § 11-43-143 (1975) (firefighters); ALAsKA STAT. § 23.40.200 
(1962) (strikes by firefighters, police, correctional, mental institution, and hospital employees 
prohibited; limited strike rights granted to other public employees); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1962 
(West 1971) (firefighters); CAL. GoVT. CODE§§ 3523.5, 3549 (West 1980) (excluding state em-
ployees and teachers, respectively, from the right to strike afforded private employees by CAL. 
LAB. CODE§ 923 (West 1971)); CoNN. GEN. STAT.§§ 5-279, 7-475, 10-153(e) (1981) (prohibit-
ing strikes by state employees, municipal employees, and teachers, respectively); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 2, § 1613(d), tit. 14, § 4011(c), tit. 19, § 1312 (1974) (strikes by transit workers, teach-
ers, and public employees, generally, respectively, prohibited); D.C. CODE ANN. 1-618.5 
(1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 447.SOl(e), 447.505; (West 1977) GA. CODE ANN.§§ 89.1301 (pub-
lic employees generally), 89.9917 (1980) (criminal liability, for those who incite a strike); HA-
WAII REv. STAT.§ 89-12 (1976) (nonessential employees in recognized bargaining units may 
strike after exhausting statutory impasse procedures); IDAHO CODE § 44-1811 (1949) 
(firefighters); IowA CoDE ANN.§ 20-12 (West 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 75-4333(c)(5) (1977); 
KY. REv. STAT.§§ 78.470, 345.130 (1977) (police and firefighters respectively); ME. REv. STAT. 
ANN.§§ 964(2)(c)(l-3), 979-C(2)(c)(l-3) (1964) MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. (1978) §§ 6-410, 6-513 
(teachers); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 150 E, §§ 9A, 15 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976); MlcH. COMP. 
LAWS § 423.202 (1?70); MINN. STAT. ANN. §179.51 (West 1966); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 105.530 
(1969) (explicitly refusing to grant public employees the right to strike); NEB. REv. STAT. 
§ 288.230 (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 273-A: 13 (1977); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW§ 210 (Mc-
Kinney 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1.14(1); Omo REv. CoDE. ANN. § 4117.02 (Page 1973); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, §51-lOl(B) (firefighters and police), tit. 70, § 509.8 (1978) (teachers); P.R. 
LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §§ 91-97 (1966) (if strike amounts to a "grave emergency," governor may, 
upon report by a special commission, seek ex parte injunction to compel strikers to return to 
work); R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 28-7-45, 28-9.3-1, 28-9.4-16, 36-11-6 (1!?69) (firefighters, police and 
health care providers; teachers; municipal employees; state employees, respectively); S.D. 
CoDIFlED LAWS ANN.§ 3-18-10 (1980); TENN. CoDE ANN.§ 49-9 (1977) (teachers); TEX. REv. 
CIV. STAT. ANN. tit. 83 § 5154(c)(3) (Vernon 1971) (state epiployees, firefighters, police), TEX. 
Eouc. CooE ANN. §13.216 (Vernon 1972) (teachers); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 903, (state em-
ployees strikes allowed unless they occur less than 30 days after fact finder's report or after 
arbitration is agreed to, or will endanger the health, safety, or welfare of the public); VA. CODE 
§ 40.1-55 (1981); WASH. REV. CoDE 41.56.120 (1981); WIB. STAT.§§ 111.70(4)(1), 111.77(1), 
lll.89(1) (1974). See also ill. Atty. Gen. Op. No. S-804 at 249 (1974); 75 Ky. Atty. Gen. Op. 
126 (1975); 60 Utah Atty. Gen. Op. 003, at 288 (1960). 
The !ndiana statute banning strikes was invalidated for unconstitutio~ lack of judicial 
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ployees are not uncommon.2 Ordinarily public employers enforce 
this prohibition through court-ordered injunctions3 or employment-
related sanctions.4 Recently, however, both public employers5 and 
private citizens6 have attempted to supplement these enforcement 
mechanisms by suing illegally striking unions for damages. The few 
courts confronted with such suits have divided on whether to recog-
nize a private cause of action for damages resulting from illegal 
strikes by public employees.7 
This Note argues that in the absence of any clear indication that 
the legislature intended to bar such suits, courts should uphold pri-
vate actions whenever plaintiffs can establish the elements of a com-
mon-law tort. Part I briefly outlines the various theories supporting 
the view that public sector collective bargaining statutes preempt pri-
review of administrative discretion, Indiana Educ. Employment Relations Bd. v. Benton Com-
munity School Corp., 266 Ind. 491,365 N.E.2d 752 (1977), and has not been reenacted. Strikes 
remain illegal in Indiana, however, by force of Anderson Fedn. of Teachers, 252 Ind. 558, 254 
· N.E.2d 329 (1970). 
2. On the frequency of public employee strikes see Cole, Public Employee Strikes - Tlte 
£aw and Possible Altematives, ll CUM. L. REv. 315, 316 n.5 (1980). 
3. ''That right of public employees to strike has usually been tested by an application for 
an injunction forbidding the strike. The right of the governmental body to this relief has been 
uniformly upheld. It has been put on various grounds: public policy; interference with gov-
ernmental function; illegal discrimination against the right of any citizen to apply for govern-
ment employment (where the union sought a closed shop)." Norwalk Teachers' Assn, v. Board 
of Educ., 138 Conn. 269,274, 83 A.2d 482,484 (1951). Thus, although many statutory schemes 
specifically include the injunction remedy, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 23.40.200(b); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 447.507(2) (West 1977) IowA CODE ANN. § 20-12 (West 1978), such relief remains 
available at common law in the absence of expressed statutory authorization. Holland School 
Dist v. Holland Educ. Assn., 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968). 
4. E.g., GA. CODE ANN.§ 89-1303 (1978); low A CODE ANN.§ 20-12(4) (West 1978); Va. 
Code§ 40.1-55 (1981) 
· 5. Pasadena Unified School Dist v. Pasadena Fedn. of Teachers, 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 140 
Cal. Rptr. 41 (1977); Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fedn. of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 252 
N.W.2d 818 (1977); City of Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale, & Department Store Union, 1979-
80 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 37,157 (W. Va. 1980). 
6. Caso v. District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1973); Caso v. Gotbaum, 
67 Misc. 2d 205, 323 N.Y.S.2d (1971), revd, 38 A.D. 2d 955, 321 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1972); Burns 
Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Linder, 108 Misc. 2d 458, 437 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. 
1981); Jamur Prod. Corp. v. Quill, SI Misc. 2d 501, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. 1966); 
Fulenwider v. Fire.fighters (IAFF) Local 1784, 1979-80 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) f 36,956 
(Tenn. App. June 2, 1980); Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & 
Pilots, West Coast & Pac. Region Inland Div., Branch G, 92 Wash. 2d 762, 600 P.2d 1282 
(1979) (en bane). 
7. The Supreme Courts of Michigan, Washington, and West Virginia have held that pri-
vate plaintiffs cannot prevail in an action against a public employees' union for damages in-
filcted by illegal strikes. Appellate courts in New York and Tennessee have held that private 
citizens may succeed in actions for such strike-infilcted damages. See Lamphere Schools v. 
Lamphere Fedn. of Schools, 400 Mich. 104, 252 N.W.2d 818 (1977); Burns Jackson Miller 
Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 108 Misc. 2d 458, 437 N.Y.S.2d ~95 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Fulenwider 
v. Fire.fighters (IAFF) Local 1784, 1979-81 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) f 36,956 (Tenn. App. 
June 2, 1980); Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots, West 
Coast & Pac. Region Inland Div., Branch G, 92 Wash. 2d 762, 600 P.2d 1282 (1979) (en bane); 
City of Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale, and Dept Store Union, 1979-80 Pub. Bargaining Cas. 
(CCH) f 37,157 (W. Va. Oct 21, 1980). 
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vate actions. The analysis is necessarily general, 8 but Part I con-
cludes that in most cases neither the language and structure of the 
applicable statute nor an analogy to federal labor law will resolve the 
preemption question. Part II, therefore, looks to the policies that an-
imate no-strike provisions and argues that private actions generally 
further those policies. Finally, Part III advances nuisance and negli-
gence as valid theories for imposing and defining union liability in 
tort to private plaintiffs injured by illegal strikes. 
I. PREEMPTION OF PRNATE ACTIONS 
The statutory regimes governing employment relations in the 
public sector fall primarily into three categories. Many states recog-
nize the right of public employees to bargain collectively under a 
comprehensive statutory and administrative scheme but prohibit 
strikes by public employees.9 Other states simply outlaw strikes, 
without recognizing a right to bargain collectively.10 And a few 
8. It is not possible within the scope of this Note to identify, much less analyze, the various 
approaches state courts might take toward the preemption issue. State courts are bound, as a 
general matter, to follow rules of statutory construction laid down by the legislature. See Hall, 
Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HAR.v. L. REv. 748, 754-56 (1935). In the 
absence of legislative guidance, courts will presumably rely on common-law construction ca-
nons, see note 18 infra, a course that this Note argues will often yield no more thanpost-ltoc 
rationalization for results that should be arrived at only through the sort of policy analysis 
advanced in Part Il. 
9. Comprehensive collective bargaining schemes typically include recognition of the em-
ployees' right to organize and of the employer's duty to bargain in good faith; provisions for 
bargaining unit determination and exclusive representation; definition of prohibited labor 
practices; an administrative agency to implement the statutory system, process grievances, and 
act as fact finder; judicial review of the administrative agency; provisions outlawing strikes 
under at least some circumstances; and remedies for violations of the statute. Such schemes 
include: 5 u.s.c. §§ 7101-7135 (1976); Al.AsKA STAT. §§ 23.40.070-23.40.260 (1962); CAL. 
GOVT. CODE§§ 3500-3548.8 (West 1980); CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 5270-5280, 7-467-7-477, 10-
153(a)-I0-153(m) (1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 4001-4013 tit. 19, §§ 1301-1312; HAWAII 
REV. STAT. §§ 89-1-30; IDAHO CODE §§ 44-1801-44-1811 (1977) (firefighters); loWA CODE 
ANN.§§ 20.1-20.29 (West 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN.§§ 72-5413-72-5431 (1980); §§ 75-4321-75-
4335; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.26 §§ 961-974, 979-979(N); MD. EDUC. CODE ANN.§§ 6-401-6-
411 (1981) (teachers); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E, §§ 1-15 (Michie/Law. Co-op) (1976); 
MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 179.50-179.58 (West 1976); MoNT. CODE ANN.§§ 39-31-101-39-31-409 
(1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 288.010-288.280 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 273-A:1-273-
A:16 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 34:13A-l-34:13A-13 (West 1965); N.Y. JUD. LAW §751 (Mc-
Kinney 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 51-101-51-113, tit. 70, §§ 509.1-509.10 (West 1978) 
(police and firefighters, and teachers, respectively); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 243.650-243.782 (1979); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 28-9.1-1-28-9.1-16 (firefighters), 28-9.3-1-28-9.3-16 (teachers), 28-9.4-1-28-
9.4-19 (municipal employees), 36-11-1-36-11-6 (1969) (state employees); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
ANN. §§ 3-18-1-3-18-17 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-5501-49-5516 (1977) {teachers); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 901-1007 (1972) (state employees), tit. 16, §§ 1981-2010 (1974) (teachers), 
tit. 21, §§ 1721-1735 (1978) (municipal employees); WASH. REV. CODE§§ 41.56.010-41.56.960 
(public employees generally), 41.59.010-41.59.950 (1981) (teachers); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 111.70-111.97 (West 1974) (municipal and state employees). · 
10. GA. CODE ANN. § 89.1301 (public employees generally); Omo REv. CODE ANN. 
§§ 4117.01-4117.05 (Page 1980); Tux. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154(c)(3) (Vernon 1971) 
(prohibiting public sector collective bargaining and voiding contracts so arrived at, as well as 
prohibiting strikes); VA. CODE§§ 40.1-55-40.1-57.l (1950). 
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states have no statutory provisions whatsoever regulating the right to 
strike or recognizing the right to bargain.11 
The preemption question poses the most difficulty in jurisdictions 
operating under the first regime.12 Where the legislature has both 
flatly prohibited strikes and established a comprehensive scheme to 
govern public sector labor relations, courts must first consider 
whether recognizing private actions would contravene the legisla-
ture's intent. Specifically, courts might examine the language and 
structure of the statute to determine whether private actions comport 
with the statutory scheme. Courts also might look to federal labor 
law and reason by analogy from the federal approach to preemption. 
A. Statutory Language as Indicative of an Intention lo Preempt 
Whether public employee statutes preempt private damage ac-
tions is not likely to be resolved by standard techniques of statutory 
construction. Ordinarily, courts look first to statutory language in 
their attempts to discern legislative intent.13 But the typical public 
employee statute14 does not mention private actions, and little ex-
trinsic evidence bears on the legislative intent to preempt, permit, or 
imply private actions.15 
This is not surprising, for these statutes were enacted well before 
the fairly recent recognition of the possibility of private actions.16 
II. Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
West Virginia, Wyoming. Now that Indiana's state employee collective bargaining statute has 
been declared unconstitutional, see note I supra, it also belongs in this group. 
12. Where no statute governs public sector labor relations, no statutory language need be 
interpreted and only common law policies require consideration. Where the only relevant 
statute is a simple strike ban, the policies favoring collective bargaining do not partake of 
legislative significance. 
13. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976). 
14. See note 9 supra. The Florida statute, however, provides for actions against illegally 
striking unions, brought by the public employer. FLA STAT. § 447.507(4) (1979). The Iowa 
code provides that "(e]ach of the remedies and penalties provided by this section is separate 
and several, and is in addition to any other legal or equitable remedy or penalty." low A CODB 
ANN.§ 20-12(6) (West 1978). Even such oblique references to the possibility of other, nonstat-
utory remedies rarely appear in public sector collective bargaining statutes. 
15. Many states, of course, do not compile legislative histories even today. See C. NUT-
TINY & R. DICKERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 560 (1978) ("[F]ormal com-
mittee reports are not usually customary in many state legislatures."). A review of the 
legislative history pertaining to the Michigan statute suggests that the legislature did not con-
sider the preemption issue. See MicH. HousB JOURNAL, Reg. Sess. (1947) 790, 864, 1003, 
lll5, ll58, ll79, 1617-18, 1666-67; MICH. SEN. JOURNAL, Reg. Sess. (1947) 974, 1176-77, 203, 
1243-44, 1268, 1336-38; MICH. HOUSE JOURNAL, Reg. Sess. (1965) 980, 1332, 1777-81, 1860-66, 
2329-30, 2481-82, 2579-80, 2963; MICH. SEN. JOURNAL, Reg. Sess. (1965) 1261, 1482-84, 1629-
31. 
16. The earliest reported decision of a case involving a damage action against a public 
employee union for an illegal strike is apparently Jamur Prod. v. Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 501,273 
N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. 1966). Defendants' counsel in that case later wrote: "Our careful 
search, as well as that of experienced and resourceful counsel for the plaintiffs in this group of 
cases, has not revealed any judicial precedent dealing with private damage actions against 
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Statutory silence, therefore, probably indicates only that the legisla-
ture did not consider this issue.17 In this statutory vacuum, the can-
ons of construction provide a rationalization for any result, but a 
principled justification for none.18 In the absence of an express sav-
ing or exclusivity provision, 19 courts generally cannot conclude with 
unions conducting public employees' strikes." Waldman, Damage Actions and Other Remedies 
in the Public E111JJloyee Strike, 20 N.Y.U. CoNF. LAB. 259, 260 (1968). The Jamur court dis-
missed the action. The first reported decision to uphold union liability appears to be Caso v. 
Gotbaum, 67 Misc. 2d 205, 323 N.Y.S.2d 742 (Sup. Ct. 1971), revd on other grounds, 38 
A.D.2d 955, 331 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1972). Consequently, legislatures had no reason to consider 
private damage action until 1971, long after most of the collective bargaining statutes appeared 
in the books. 
17. See McGill v. EPA, 593 F.2d 631,636 (5th Cir. 1979). (''It would be sophistry for us to 
divine a congressional intent on a subject it did not consider.") John Gray's words apply quite 
clearly here: 
Interpretation is generally spoken of as if its chief function was to discover what the 
meaning of the Legislature really was. But when a Legislature has had a real intention, 
one way or another, on a point, 1t is not once in a hundred times that any doubt arises to 
what its intention was. If that were all that a judge had to do with a statute, interpreta-
tion, instead of being one of the most difficult of a judge's duties, would be extremely 
easy. The fact is that the difficulties of so-called interpretation arise when the Legislature 
had no meaning at all; when the question which is raised on the statute never occurred to 
it; when what the judges have to do is, not to determine what the Legislature did mean on 
a point which was present to its mind, but to guess what it would have intended on a point 
not present to its mind, if the point had been present. 
J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 165 (1909). 
18. The canons amount to no more than a dialectical system, each tenet of which opposes 
another, equally plausible, venerable, and epigrammatic, but calling for a completely opposite 
result. See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons 
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 V ANO. L. R.Ev. 395, 401-06 (1950). The points of 
this dialectic applicable to legislatively intended preemption of private remedies for public 
remedies for public employee strikes are (1) that statutes should not be interpreted to derogate 
the common law without a clear expression oflegislative intent, and (2) that a comprehensive 
system of regulation itself indicates legislative intent to completely occupy the field and dis-
place the common law. See, e.g., California v. S.S. Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922, 929 (C.D. 
Cal. 1969) ("The mere fact that Congress codifies a cause of action and provides a penalty 
creates no presumption of the nonexistence of similar rights at common law . . ."); Terry v. 
Lincscott Hotel Corp., 126 Ariz. 548, 552 617 P.2d 56, 60 (Ct. App. 1980) ("Statutes are not to 
be construed as effecting any change in the common law beyond that which is clearly indi-
cated"); Porter v. Porter, 286 N.W.2d 649, 655 (Iowa 1979) ("statutes will not be construed as 
taking away common law rights . . . unless that result is imperatively required"). Examples 
of comprehensive regulatory schemes displacing the common law include Isbrandtsen Co. v. 
Johnson, 343 U.S. 779 (1952) (regulation of shipping); Fulton Cty. Fiscal Court v. Nashville, 
C. & St. L. Ry., 202 Ky. 846, 261 S.W. 617 (1924) (regulation of railroad crossings); Boston Ice 
Co. v. Boston & M. R.R., 77 N.H. 6, 86 A. 356 (1913) (liability rules for fires caused by railroad 
operations). 
Insofar as this war between the maxims requires technical resolution, state public employee 
labor statutes are generally no more comprehensive than the federal legislation from which 
they evolved. Given that the Supreme Court has found room within the federal labor statutes 
for state court tort claims based on illegal labor practices, in spite of the added obstacle posed 
by the Supremacy Clause, these statutes should not preempt private remedies by virtue of their 
"comprehensiveness." See note 32 in.fra. 
19. A saving clause "is said to preserve from destruction certain rights, remedies or privi-
leges which would otherwise be destroyed by the general enactment." IA C. SANDS, STATUTES 
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 20.22 (4th ed. 1972). An exclusivity provision is intended 
to make clear that a statute "creates a new right or imposes a new duty or liability, unknown to 
the common law, and gives a remedy'' that is exclusive. BLAcK.'s LAW DICTIONARY 674 (4th 
ed.~ . . 
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certainty that the legislature would have either rejected or welcomed 
private actions. 
B. Statutory Structure as Indicative of an Intention To Preempt 
Because statutory language alone cannot resolve the issue, courts 
must look elsewhere to infer what the legislature would have in-
tended had it considered private actions. Specifically, a court might 
attempt to determine whether private actions are consistent with the 
statutorily established enforcement scheme.20 This approach sug-
gests two arguments supporting the view that private actions have 
been preempted, but both yield at best indeterminate, and at worst 
misguided, results. 
The first argument would focus on the fact that many public em-
ployee statutes set out in comprehensive detail the enforcement op-
tions available to the state for violations of a no-strike clause. A 
court might conclude that private actions would have been expressly 
mentioned had the legislature intended to allow them.21 But it seems 
equally reasonable to assume that state legislatures act with full 
awareness that extant or evolving common law actions might com-
plement statutory remedies. 22 Courts should, of course, fashion 
common law to minimize its interference with legislation, but they 
should not refuse to consider a common law claim merely because it 
arises out of conduct that is also statutorily regulated. The growing 
codification of American law would leave little to the judiciary if 
deference to the legislature demanded abdication of a court's com-
mon law function in all cases arguably affected by a statute.23 
The second argument in support of the preemption conclusion 
also relies on the statutory specification of enforcement procedures. 
A court might reason that because public employee statutes provide 
for extraordinary enforcement procedures - procedures not gener-
20. See generally C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHJP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LA w 4-
5 (1969) ("[L]egislative activity, administrative rulemaking ••• the making of written constitu-
tions have brought into being in highly developed form [the method of] searching • • • the 
written text for its reasoning in application to the presented case."). 
21. Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fedn. of Schools, 400 Mich. 104, 112-13, 252 N.W.2d 
818, 821-22 (1977). 
22. Several state legislatures currently examine decisions rendered by their courts in an 
attempt to modify legislation where necessary. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 24.065(a)(l) - (3) 
(1979 Supp.) (requiring State Legislative Council to "annually examine administrative regula-
tions, published opinions of state and federal courts • • • to determine whether or not • • • the 
courts and agencies are properly implementing legislative purposes . • • the opinions or regu-
lations indicate unclear or ambiguous statutes."); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 4.311-4.327 (Supp. 
1979) (requiring Law Revision Commission to "examine the common law and statutes of the 
state and current judicial decisions for the purpose of discovering defects and anachronisms in 
the law .•• .''). See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OP STATUTES 29-30 
(1982). 
23. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 22, at 4-5; Note, Intent, Clear Statements and the Com-
mon Law: Stalulory Interpretation in the SUJ7reme Court, 95 HAR.v. L. REv. 892, 912-15 (1982). 
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ally available as remedies in a civil suit - these provisions somehow 
preempt the less drastic remedy of compensatory damages.24 But 
this approach ignores the possibility that the legislature might have 
merely reserved the most drastic sanctions for its exclusive use -
just as the legislature often imposes criminal penalties for conduct 
that also gives rise to private damage actions.25 A court could rea-
sonably hold that a statute does not authorize private actions to en-
force its own provision26 without concluding that the legislature 
intended to bar all private remedies, particularly when the private 
remedy is compensatory rather than punitive. 
C. Analogy to Federal Labor Law 
Since the language and structure of the relevant state statutes do 
not answer the preemption question, a court might seek guidance in 
federal labor law. The strength of the analogy to federal labor law 
will, of course, vary from state to state, depending on the statutory 
and administrative scheme in question and the state interests per-
ceived to be at stake. This approach has much to commend it; after 
all, many public employee statutes were patterned after the National 
Labor Relations Act27 (NLRA). As a result, state courts often accord 
federal labor law decisions persuasive weight when interpreting their 
own statutes.28 Analogy to federal labor law, however, cannot dic-
tate a result one way or the other on the preemption question. Gen-
24. The Lamphere Schools court's language at one point suggests this approach. 400 Mich. 
104, 114 n.3. (''There was no precedent for the proposed action under the common law at the 
time the [public employee statute] was enacted . . . . Nor may such a cause be implied from 
the [statute]. Furthermore, the statutory remedy • •. is adequate.") (emphasis added). 
25. For example, most states treat the creation of a public nuisance as a crime, although 
civil actions will still lie for private parties seeking redress for special damages. See note 117 
supra. See generally Pound, Introduction to F. SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW xxxiii (1927) 
("In the beginnings of law, tort and crime are undifferentiated."). 
26. The Supreme Court of Washington has implied that the omission from the state's pub-
lic sector labor relations statute of a provision parallel to § 303(b) of the Labor Management 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1976), indicates that the legislature chose to exclude damage 
remedies from the statutory regime. See Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Mas-
ters, Mates & Pilots, 92 Wash. 2d 762, 773, 600 P.2d 1282, 1288-89 (1979) (en bane). However, 
§ 303 applies only to the recognition of a damage remedy for violation of certain substantive 
sections of the LMRA itself. Consequently, omission of a parallel section does not indicate an 
intention to preclude common-law damage remedies predicated on duties independent of the 
statute. 
27. See, e.g., Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fedn. of Teachers, 400 Mich. at 119-20. 
Compare statutes set out in note 9 supra, with 20 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976 & Supp. m 1979). 
The right to organize, the duty to bargain, and the primary implementation authority of an 
administrative agency all derive from the NLRA. 
28. See, e.g., 400 Mich. at 119-24; Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, 
Mates & Pilots, 92 Wash. 2d at 773; 600 P.2d 1288-89; 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION 320 (4th ed. 1972) ("State and federal statutes may be in pari materia, 
and if so, should be construed together, for it may be presumed that the legislature had in 
mind existing federal statutes relating to the same subject matter when enacting the statute 
being construed and that affected parties would have their understanding of the state act infiu-
enced by it since the people of the state are subject thereto."). 
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erality necessarily limits the analysis presented here,29 while a 
detailed analysis of the state interests that would underlie a court's 
decision to dismiss or allow private actions on the basis of analogy to 
federal labor law is deferred until Part II. But some of the more 
obvious factors that might concern a court analogizing to federal la-
bor law deserve immediate consideration: 
At least one court has expressed the fear that allowing private 
actions would require the adjudication of ancillary unfair labor 
practice charges that would, if substantiated, constitute a defense 
against state enforcement of sanctions established under a no-strike 
clause. In Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Federation of Schoo!s,30 
the Michigan Supreme Court reasoned that private actions would 
contravene earlier decisions vesting exclusive jurisdiction of unfair 
labor practice charges in the state's Michigan Employment Relations 
Commission.31 While understandable, the court's concern fails to 
justify this severe reaction. The same conduct - in this case, a strike 
- may give rise to different issues,32 and the court could have con-
cluded that the strike violated common-law duties without deciding 
the unfair labor practice issue.33 Union defenses against sanctions 
sought by the public employer would not necessarily constitute a de-
fense to the tort claims of private citizens if those claims did not 
depend on a violation of the statute.34 The tort theories advocated 
29. See note 8 supra. 
30. 400 Mich. 104,253 N.W.2d 818 (1977). 
31. TheLampltere Scltoo!s court was particularly concerned with unfair labor practice de-
fenses, 400 Mich. at 118-19, 253 N.W.2d at 824-25, but there are any number of other issues 
that might be better resolved in an arbitration setting then in court. See generally Van Wezel 
Stone, Tlte Postwar Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (19~1). 
32. Under federal labor law, for example, conduct allegedly in violation of state law is not 
immune from liability merely because the conduct also can be viewed as involving labor rela-
tions concerns. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of 
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 198 (1978). In Sears a retail store owner attempted to oust pickets 
from his property by filing a state-law trespass action. Depending upon its purpose, the picket-
ing might have, but need not have, constituted an unfair labor practice. ("If Sears had filed a 
charge, the federal issue would have been whether the picketing had a recognitional or work-
reassignment objective; decision of that issue would have entailed relatively complex factual 
and legal determinations completely unrelated to the simple question whether a trespass had 
occurred. Conversely, in the state action, Sears only challenged the location of the picketing; 
whether the. picketing had an objective proscribed by federal law was irrelevant to the state 
claim.") Correspondingly, a claim that a public employee strike constitutes negligence or a 
public nuisance does not depend on violation of the collective bargaining statute, and hence 
does not implicate the labor board's primary jurisdiction over statutory unfair labor practices. 
33. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 
180, 198 (1978). 
34. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 288C (1965) ("Compliance with a legislative en-
actment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence where area-
sonable man would take additional precautions."); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 821B, Comment d (1965); see City of Chicago v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 24 Ill. App. 3d 
624, 321 N.E.2d 412 (1974) (compliance with environmental regulations does not preclude 
liability ~or public nuisance). 
May 1982] Note - Public Union Strikes 1279 
by this Note do not depend on statutory violations.35 Consequently, 
solicitude for the primary jurisdiction of administrative agencies as-
signed to resolve alleged violations of collective bargaining statutes 
should not bar claims advanced under these theories. 
The unfair labor practice defense issue is but a specific example 
of a broader problem that might weigh in favor of preemption. 
Under federal labor law, courts regularly defer to the National La-
bor Relation Board's (NLRB) administrative expertise;36 they rely 
on the board's expertise in labor-related matters to justify its exclu-
sive jurisdiction over matters that might otherwise properly be heard 
in state or federal forums.37 A state court might reason that private 
actions would strip state agencies analogous to the NLRB of exclu-
sive jurisdiction over labor disputes. This is a valid concern: The 
administrative expertise that ultimately justifies exclusive agency ju-
risdiction is less likely to develop if courts regularly bypass the 
agency without good reason.38 
Nevertheless, courts should hesitate to assume that the analogy 
between the NLRB and state administrative agencies warrants the 
same degree of deference to agency expertise that prevails in the fed-
eral context. The most obvious difference between the expertise of 
federal and state agencies concerns their respective scope. The 
NLRB is an extensively staffed, hierarchically organized agency that 
handles a nationwide docket of private sector labor disputes. 39 Most 
state agencies, by contrast, draw on a far more ~ted stock of 
cases.40 It is not unreasonable to suppose that state agencies can 
35. See text accompanying notes 113-116 in.fro. 
36. See generally Van Wezel Stone, supra note 31. It has been assumed, for example, that 
the NLRB is capable of assessing the effect of an employer's speech on employee conduct. See 
NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 463 U.S. 469,479 (1941) ("[T)he purport of these utter-
ances may be altered by imponderable subtleties at work, which it is not our function to 
appraise."). 
37. See, e.g., Amalgamated Assn. of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 288 
(1974): , 
The rationale for preemption . • . rests in large measure upon our determination that 
when it set down a federal labor policy Congress plainly meant to do more than simply 
alter the then-prevailing substantive law. It sought as well to restructure fundamentally 
the processes for effectuating that policy, deliberately placing the responsibility for apply-
ing and developing this comprehensive legal system in the hands of an expert administra-
tive body rather than the federalized judicial system. 
(Footnote omitted.) 
38. See Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARv. L. REv. 393 (ad-
vancing the view that "incrementalist" policymaking by administrative agencies was dominant 
from 1930 through the mid-1960s, agency adjudication and rulemaking reviewed "leniently'' 
on factual issues). 
39. See R. SMITH, L MEruuFrnLo & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAW CASES AND 
MATERIALS 56 (6th ed. 1979) (NLRB disposed of 37,602 complaints in 1977 fiscal year.). 
40. By contrast to the annual volume of NLRB dispositions, the Michigan Employment 
Relations Commission, for example, issued only 151 decisions in 1980. This figure was de-
rived from the index to its annual volume of decisions. See XV MERC Labor Opinions at 2r-
6r (1980). 
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never develop a level of expertise equivalent to that of the NLRB. 
Less persuasive reasons, therefore, might support judicial deference 
to administrative expertise in the state context -particularly when a 
court faces novel questions of common law. In any event, if exclusive 
agency jurisdiction is thought imperative, or if private actions re-
quire adjudication of matters properly within the ageny's jurisdic-
tion, courts should simply stay proceedings until the agency reaches 
its decision.41 This procedure would preserve whatever administra-
tive expertise the agency has to offer without denying plaintiffs their 
common-law rights. 
In general, then, neither conventional statutory analysis nor anal-
ogies to federal labor law resolve the preemption issue.42 Given that 
the legislature had no opportunity to consider private actions when 
enacting public sector labor statutes, both the decision that such stat-
utes pre-empt private damage actions and the decision that they do 
not risk contravening the rule the legislature would have laid down 
had it considered the issue.43 The best course through this statutory 
vacuum evaluates private actions in light of the goals of public em-
ployee statutes in an effort to further the broader policy purposes 
animating this legislation. Federal courts44 pursue this type of anal-
ysis whenever they consider whether the NLRA pre-empts a tort 
claim arising under state law. State courts should avoid superficial 
attempts to resolve the private action question by mechanical appli-
cation of construction canons or misplaced analogies to federal labor 
law.45 An open reliance on policy analysis follows the best common-
law tradition, 46 and possesses the added advantage of apprising the 
legislature of the court's concerns.47 Legislatures certainly have the 
41. See, e.g., Bechtel Corp. v. Local 215, Laborers' Intl. Union, 544 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir. 
1976). 
42. Since the framers of neither the state, see note 17 supra, nor the federal legislation 
considered the propriety of private !ictions, this should not be surprising. The framers of the 
federal legislation, involved with conferring the right to strike on private sector workers, 
clearly did not contemplate private actions against public employee unions for illegal strikes. 
43. See McGill v. EPA, 593 F.2d 631, 636 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(It would be sophistry for us to divine a congressional intent on a subject it did not con-
sider. Nor would it be permissible for us simply to withhold judgement on the basis that 
there is no law to apply. Instead we must attempt, at least in part intuitively, to determine 
how we think Congress would have voted had the question been r_aised legislatively.). 
44. See, e.g., McGill v. EPA, 593 F.2d at 636-37; Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power 
Com.mn., 445 F.2d 739, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en bane), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1013 (1971); In re 
Order Authorizing Interception of Oral Communications and Video-tape Surveillance, 513 F. 
Supp. 421, 423 (D. Mass. 1980); B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF TIIE JUDICIAL PROCESS 128 
(1921) ("Obscurity of statute or of precedent or of customs or of morals, or collision between 
some or all of them, may leave the law unsettled, and cast a duty upon the courts to declare it 
retrospectively in the exercise of a power ftankly legislative in function." (emphasis added); J. 
GRAY, supra note 17. 
45. See note 32 supra. 
46. G. CALABRESI, supra note 22, at 178-81; B. CARDOZO, supra note 44, at 128. 
47. G. CALABRESI, supra note 22, at 29-30. 
May 1982] Note - Public Union Strikes 1281 
authority to revise whatever result a court might reach, and nothing 
suggests that they will hesitate to do so when they disagree with a 
court's resolution of the private action question.48 
II. THE IMPACT OF PRIVATE DAMAGE ACTIONS ON THE POLICIES 
EMBODIED IN PUBLIC EMPLOYEE STATUTES 
A. Policy Interests Underlying Public Employee Statutes 
The propriety of recognizing private actions for strike-inflicted 
damages depends on a careful weighing of the likelihood that these 
actions would further or frustrate important state policies. Because 
comprehensive public sector collective bargaining statutes incorpo-
rating no-strike provisions reflect a variety of interests,49 a court 
faced with deciding whether to allow private actions must consider 
how these actions would affect such interests. Accordingly, this Part 
seeks to identify these broad interests and to examine how private 
actions would affect them. 
1. Public Policy of Collective Bargaining Rights 
for Public Employees 
Public employee statutes reflect concerns that go beyond merely 
prohibiting strikes. The policy objectives that forged private sector 
labor law also relate to labor relations between governments and 
their employees. It has long been recognized that "[t]he claims upon 
public policy made by the need for industrial peace, industrial de-
mocracy and effective political representation point toward collective 
bargaining for public employees."50 Indeed, collective bargaining 
has been viewed as one means of avoiding illegal strikes, precisely 
because it serves to improve working conditions and terms of em-
ployment and to encourage an ongoing, harmonious relationship be-
tween public employers and employees.51 Appeals to fundamental 
48. State legislatures were not reluctant, for example, to reenact their death penalty stat-
utes. See w. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 613 (5th ed. 
1980). 
49. See, e.g., Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 61 MICH. L. R.Ev. 931, 931 (1969) 
("One of the major unmet challenges we face is how to prevent strikes by public employees 
without denying them the right to organize and bargain collectively."); Comment, Collective 
Bargaining/or Public Employees and the Prevention of Strikes in the Public Sector, 68 MICH. L. 
REv. 260, at 260 ("Because of the inherent conflict in legislative goals, it is unclear at the 
present time whether the new statutes can achieve both the promotion of fairer employment 
contracts than have prevailed in the past and the prevention of all strikes in public employ-
ment.") (emphasis in original). 
50. Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 
YALE LJ. 1107, ms (1969). 
51. See, e.g., Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 61 MICH. L. 
REv. 943, 953-54; Kheel, supra note 49 at 942: 
I suggest that reliance on legal prohibitions, penalties, and elaborate third-party recom-
mendations has not worked, and that before we turn in desperation to compulsory third-
party determination, which cannot serve as a steady diet, we should give bargaining in the 
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fairness can also justify collective bargaining: It would be anoma-
lous to deny public employees, who perform essential and often dan-
gerous services in the public interest, a privilege almost universally 
granted private sector_ employees.52 
This does not mean, however, that public employees ought to 
possess the same labor rights and benefits as employees in the private 
sector. The concerns that support collective bargaining for public 
employees may argue for an approximate balance in the bargaining 
power of public employers and public employee unions,53 but it is by 
no means clear that the same balance should prevail in the public 
sector and in the private sector, or that only complete incorporation 
of private sector labor rights in the public sector can achieve this 
balance. The sound policy considerations that underlie the no-strike 
provisions in most public employee statutes54 - as well as principled 
respect for the sovereign prerogatives of state and local govem-
ments55 - may justify significant differences between the rights of 
public and private sector employees. A review of the policies that 
support public employee strike bans suggests both that significant 
differences between private and public employers justify no-strike 
clauses and that correlative differences between private and public 
unions diminish any fear that an effective strike ban will destroy col-
lective bargaining. 
2. Public Policy Behind the Strike Ban 
The theories that strikes by public employees should be outlawed 
because they offend the government's sovereignty,56 or because pub-
public sector the same opportunity it has received, with beneficial results, in the private 
sector. 
52. Edwards, Tlte Emerging ./July To Bargain in tlte Public Sector, 11 MlcH. L. REV. 885 
(1973) ("[A) government which imposes upon private employers certain obligations in dealing 
with their employees may not in good faith refuse to deal with its own public servants on a 
reasonably similar basis modified, of course, to meet the exigencies of public service.") (quot-
ing 1955 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS 
LAW, REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON LABOR RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES 89-90), 
53. See, eg., Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fedn. of Teachers, 400 Mich. at 131 ("The 
precarious and uneasy balance of labor-management power which exists in the public labor 
relations sector could be easily upset [by private damage actions)."); Caso v. District Council 
37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 161 ("The Taylor Law reflects the Legislature's attempt to delicately bal-
ance the rights of public employees against those of their employers."); Burke & Thomas, Inc. 
v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 92 Wash. 2d at 772, 600 P.2d 1282 at 1288-89 
(en bane). See also Comment, supra note 75, at 275-76, 302. 
54. See text accompanying notes 83-108 i'!fra. 
55. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976) ("One undoubted 
attribute of State sovereignty is the State's power to determine the wages which shall be paid to 
those whom they employ in order to carry out their governmental functions. • • ."). 
56. Edwards, Tlte .Developing Labor Relations Law in tlte Public Sector, 10 DuQ. L. REv. 
351! 361 (1972). 
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lie employees owe extraordinary loyalty to the government,57 have 
given way to a more sophisticated justification for the strike ban. 
Supporters of the ban now point to political and economic realities 
that they claim require a flat prohibition of strikes. Specifically, they 
argue that the short-term perspective of government managers leads 
them to cave in to demands that unions back up by refusing to pro-
vide essential public services.58 Because employment-related deci-
sions in the public sector invariably have budgetary implications that 
require political resolution, this view maintains that perversion of 
the political process will occur if public employers cannot count on 
an effective strike bat).. s9 
Critics assail this view on three fronts. First, they question 
whether public services are in fact uniquely essential.60 Second, they 
contend that without the ability to strike, collective bargaining 
amounts to no more than collective begging.61 Finally, they note 
that these clauses often have proved ineffectual.62 A law likely to be 
breached by thousands of decent citizens, critics argue, erodes gen-
eral respect for the law, whether or not the public employer imposes 
sanctions after an illegal strike. 63 Although each of these criticisms 
57. Both theories are explicated clearly in Note, The Strike and Its Alternatives in Public 
Employment, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 549, 554-56 (1966). 
58. See, e.g., H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 13-15 (1971); 
Summers, Public Sector Collective Bargaining Substantially .Diminishes .Democracy, 1 GOVT. 
UNION REV. 5, 22 (1980); Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargaining in Public 
Employment, 79 YALE L.J. 805, 808 (1970). 
59. Chief Judge Fuld states this position unequivocally: 
Quite obviously, the ability of the Legislature to establish priorities among government 
services would be destroyed if public employees could, with impunity, engage in strikes 
which deprive the public of essential services. The striking employees, by paralyzing a 
city through the exercise of naked power, could obtain gains wholly disproportionate to 
the services rendered by them and at the expense of the public and other public employ-
ees. The consequence would be the destruction of democratic legislative processes because 
budgeting and the establishment of priorities would no longer result from the free choice 
of the electorate's representatives but from the coercive effect of paralyzing strikes of pub-
lic employees. 
City of New York v. De Lury, 23 N.Y.2d 175, 183, 243 N.E.2d 128, 132,295 N.Y.S.2d 901, 906 
(1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 455 (1969). 
Proponents of t)iese views admit to the overgeneralizations involved. See THE UNIONS 
AND THE CITIES, supra note 78, at 30. 
60. See, e.g., Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 
79 YALE LJ. 418, 418 (1970); Edwards, supra note 56, at 360, 362-63. 
61. See, e.g., Kheel, supra note 49, at 934; Rains, Collective Bargaining in Public Employ-
ment, 8 LAB, L.J. 548, 549 (1957); Wollett, The Taylor Law and the Strike Ban, PUBLIC EM-
PLOYEE ORGANIZATION AND BARGAINING (1968) at 29 29 (H. Anderson ed. 1968): Wolk, 
Public Employee Strikes-A Survey of the Condon-Wad/in Acts, 13 N.Y. L.F. 69, 69-70 (1967). 
62. See note 2 supra. 
63. "There is enough data to suggest that, in the public sector, there may be a de facto right 
to strike, despite the legal strike ban in force." Edwards, supra note 52, at 892 (citing "at least 
70 teacher strikes in the fall of 1972."). See St. Antoine, Public Employee Unions and the Law, 
QUAD. NOTES, Fall 1970, at 9, 12. 
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merits close scrutiny, they do not, even collectively, warrant interring 
no-strike provisions. 
The argument that public employees do not provide uniquely es-
sential services seeks to undercut the central premise of those who 
argue that the nature of public services enables public unions to 
wield almost unlimited power when they threaten to strike. Obvi-
ously, not all public employees provide crucial services64 and many 
private sector workers provide goods and services as important as 
those provided by the public sector.65 But this misses the point: It is 
the vulnerability of public services that truly distinguishes them from 
most services provided by the private sector.66 No readily available 
private sector capability can fill the void created by public employee 
strikes. Because the most vital public services - education and po-
lice and fire protection - are rendered without any user charge, 67 
the private sector cannot off er more than a margin of competition. 68 
Such market services as do exist - for example, private education 
and security services - cater to a limited and generally well-to-do 
clientele. 
When illegal strikes disrupt public services, therefore, alterna-
tives available in the private market will rarely suffice. Furthermore, 
the certain resumption of public services deters market entry during 
the strike. Thus, although fuel oil may be as essential to citizens as 
fire protection, a strike at one refinery does not cripple the entire 
market.69 At worst, prices rise to reflect reduced supply and the costs 
of diverting goods from other markets.70 But vital public services 
cannot be diverted readily, if at all, from other markets. Education 
64. See, e.g., Burton & Krider, supra note 60, at 426; Edwards, supra note 56, at 362; Note, 
supra note 57, at 557 ("Many strikes in the private sector are far more serious than strikes in 
certain parts of the public sector. Nevertheless, all strikes are permitted in the former and 
almost none are permitted in the latter.") (footnotes omitted). 
65 .. See note 64 supra. To take a glaring example, most doctors work in the private sector 
and most librarians in the public sector. 
66. See THE UNIONS AND THE CmES, supra note 58, at 194 ([T]here [is] ... virtually no 
fear of entry by a nonunion rival .... "); Armor, The Right to Strike: Some Basic, but Ne-
glected, Questions, 2 GOVT. UNION R.Ev., Summer 1981, at 3, II ("But the critical difference is 
that governments are, by definition, monopolies. Neither they nor their unions are affected by 
the economic flywheel that usually holds private unions and companies within the bounds of 
reality."). 
67. The most important municipal services - police and fire protection - are "public 
goods," i.e., they would be "purchased" in insufficient quantities if provided by the private 
sector. See J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 454-58 (1976). 
68. See Armor, supra note 66, at 11. 
69. When private strikes threaten utterly to preclude the availability of important products, 
the law provides for emergency procedures to terminate the strike. "[T]here is no such thing as 
an unlimited right to strike in private employment. The Congress, state legislatures, and the 
courts have for many years prescribed limitations on the right to strike . . . ." Anderson, supra 
note 51, at 948. See 29 U.S.C. § 178(a) (1976); United Steelworkers of America v. United 
States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959). 
70. See generally P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 403-05 _(9th ed. 1973). 
May 1982] Note - Public Union Strikes 1285 
and police and fire protection amount to geographically limited nat-
ural monopolies satisfying an inelastic demand that the private mar-
ket simply cannot satisfy over the short-run of a public employee 
strike.71 
Just as the differences between private and public sector services 
necessitate the strike ban to avoid the unacceptably high price that 
strikes by public employees exact in the absence of market alterna-
tives, differences between the private and public sector bargaining 
contexts suggest that the strike ban has not eviscerated collective bar-
gaining. The sensitivity of public sector management to the disrup-
tion of essential services allows unions to exercise a powerful non-
economic influence unavailable to workers in the private sector.72 
Public managers may have every incentive to satisfy union demands 
first out of available funds,73 and the costs of current contract con-
cessions often remain invisible, concealed in the fiscal catacombs of 
large municipal budgets until well into the future.74 
Public sector unions also enjoy political influence that tends to 
offset their inability to strike legally. Public employee unions have 
demonstrated that they can muster the manpower, financing, and 
discipline to utilize fully whatever political advantages they may 
possess over private sector unions.75 Whether this potential political 
influence yields bargaining leverage equal to that enjoyed by private 
employees who possess the right to strike defies certain determina-
tion. But when combined with the formal elements of statutory col-
lective bargaining - the employer's duty to bargain in good faith 
and impasse procedures that include fact-finding, mediation, concili-
ation, and arbitration76 - this unique advantage of public sector un-
ions tends to offset the loss of the strike weapon. The policies 
underlying legislative decisions to retain the strike ban thus fully 
comport with both common sense and democratic theory.77 
The argument that frequent violation justifies elimination of no-
71. See THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES, supra note 58, at 194. 
72. See THE UNIONS AND THE CmES, supra note 58, at 160-70; Comment, supra note 49, 
at 273-74. 
73. THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES, supra note 58, at 195. 
74. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that many of the larger cities, unlike private 
industry, must deal with several different bargaining units whose contracts expire at different 
times. 
75. See note 72 supra. 
76. See Anderson, supra note 51, at 953-54 (''These statutes, all of which prohibit public 
employees from striking, are based on the conviction that the political process can be substi-
tuted for the strike weapon as an orderly method of dispute resolution. • . . The theory be-
hind these laws is that fact finders or arbitrators who are empoy.rered to make 
recommendations, advisory awards, or final and binding determinations will be able to pro-
vide an effective political substitute for the strike.") (emphasis in original); Comment, supra 
note 49, at 275-88. 
77. See, e.g., note 59 supra. 
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strike clauses applies to any statutory prohibition. The legislature 
enacts every statutory norm with the knowledge that it will be vio-
lated, but this does not strip legislation of its force. 78 If anything, the 
failure of a legal norm to command obedience suggests the need for 
more effective, if not necessarily more severe, enforcement proce-
dures. 79 Finally, this argument can be challenged forcefully on the 
facts: The vast majority of public employee contracts emerge from 
collective bargaining negotiations in which strikes play no role. 80 
B. The Impact of Private .Damage Actions 
This review of the policies animating public employee statutes 
that embody both the right to collective bargaining and a prohibition 
against strikes will not convince committed opponents of either the 
strike ban or the unionization of public employees that their respec-
tive policy preferences can be reconciled within the framework of 
these statutes as they are currently written. But unlike the partisans 
on both sides of this debate, courts cannot avoid the difficult task of 
balancing the conflicting policies implicated in public employee stat-
utes. They must instead consider whether to allow private damage 
actions in light of the policies against strikes by, and in favor of col-
lective bargaining for, public employees. 
l. The Impact of .Damage Actions on the Policy Against Strikes 
Damage actions impose a cost on public employee unions for il-
legal strikes. Everything else being equal, this cost will tend to dis-
courage unions from striking and thus further the policy against 
illegal strikes.81 And this deterrence is likely to operate more effec-
tively than sanctions spelled out under a statute because of the large 
number of potential plaintiffs. 
The deterrent effect of private damage actions will be most ap-
parent in cases where public employers forgo their statutory reme-
dies. 82 If the public employer holds the bargaining advantage -
78. See J. Andenaes, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 12-13 (1974) ("[L]egislators proba-
bly realize that many will break the rules but reason that many will observe them, so that 
something, at least, will be gained."). 
79. See Armor, supra note 66, at 9-10. 
80. See Anderson, supra note 51, at 947. Cole, supra note 2, at 316, identifies 413 public 
employee strikes for the latest year of available statistics; obviously, this represents only a tiny 
fraction of the number of collective bargaining agreements reached by governmental employ-
ers and employees during this period. 
81. Armor, supra note 66, at 9-10; Note, Private .Damage Actions Against Public Sector Un-
ions for Illegal Strikes, 91 HAR.v. L. REv. 1309, 1319 (1978) (hereinafter cited as "Harvard 
Note"). 
82. See Armor, supra note 66, at 8-10; Kheel, supra note 49, at 933: 
(Describing the 1966 New York transit strike: Not only had the law failed to stop the 
strike, but it threatened to produce a second work stoppage because of the penalty provi-
sions. The enforcement of these provisions would have denied the transit workers the 
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because the employees in question perform less than critical services 
or can be easily replaced83 - injunctive relief will ordinarily be 
sought, and the union will be unable to rely on negotiated amnesty. 
If the union complies with the injunction, the strike will end quickly 
with little resulting damage. If the union defies the injunction, civil 
contempt fines will quickly exhaust its resources.84 Neither scenario 
offers private litigants much incentive to sue. 
By contrast, if a powerful union can force a public employer to 
forgo statutory and equitable remedies, private damage actions may 
function as an important equalizer. 85 Private actions are likely to 
arise only when public unions expect to nullify the employer's en-
forcement of the statute and succeed in doing so. Private citizens are 
unlikely to risk the expense and uncertainty of litigation if a struggle 
in bankruptcy court for scraps of the union's financial remains con-
stitutes the sole reward. But where economic or political realities 
frustrate the intended operation of the strike ban, private damage 
actions can have the salutary effect of significantly deterring illegal 
strikes.86 
Courts and commentators have argued, however, that private ac-
tions will tend to prolong those strikes that do occur because unions 
higher wages and other benefits negotiated under the mayor's auspices. As a result, the 
governor and the legislature concluded that there was no alternative but to waive the 
penalties despite the clear violations of the statue [sic)); 
Comment, supra note 49, at 269-70 
([W)hen enforcement is at the discretion of the employer, sanctions are rarely invoked, 
because employees dismissed on account of strike activity may be hard to replace. More-
over, when union organization is strong, a public employer is not likely to dismiss striking 
employees, because such measures would probably only exacerbate an already delicate 
situation. Manadatory sanctions have been only slightly more successful, because the 
same considerations which prevent management from invoking discretionary sanctions 
also encourage it to evade required sanctions whenever possible.) 
(footnotes omitted); Note, supra note 57 at 553-54 
(The principal concern of a public administrator whose employees are on strike is to get 
the services operating again with the shortest possible delay. Since the most expedient way 
to accomplish this is to induce the employees to go back on the job, the administrator is 
not likely to invoke strict penal provisions which stand in the way of a settlement. More-
over, in many cases it is physically impossible to resume services unless the striking em-
ployees are rehired.) 
(footnotes omitted.). 
83. See Burton & Krider, supra note 60, at 432-35. 
84. PATCO's plight offers an example. See Litigation Involving PATCO Is Still Up in the 
Air, NATL. L.J., Nov. 16, 1981, at 8, quoting a union lawyer to the effect that "[PATCO] 
stopped counting" the contempt fines "after the first 4.5 million . . . ." dollars. The summary 
of PATCO litigation, not surprisingly, disclosed no private actions. 
8~. Armor, supra note 66, at 9: 
In any jurisdiction whose no-strike law is solely enforceable by public authorities, the 
practical validity of the law is in inverse relation to the power of the union involved. If 
the union has sufficient power to prevail on its major employment issues, it also probably 
has the power to negate the law. . . . 
. . . . The only method that can make a no-strike law mean what it says, regardless of 
the incumbent in City Hall, the State House, or the White House, is private enforcement 
of the law. 
86. See notes 83-85, supra. 
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will add indemnification agreements to their list of demands. 87 Two 
factors suggest that these fears may be misplaced. First, the financial 
constraints on local governments88 will often mean that indemnifica-
tion agreements can only be granted at the expense of other union 
demands. 89 The union's prestrike perception of the cost of an illegal 
strike will thus remain the same - an indemnification agreement 
will cost the union wages and benefits that it would have otherwise 
received. Second, the common law of duress,90 judicial reluctance to 
enforce agreements violative of public policy,91 and the general rule 
against indemnification for punitive damages,92 render the enforce-
ment of such agreements problematic at best. And any possibility 
that unions might prolong strikes to secure indemnification must be 
discounted by the probability that private actions will entirely pre-
vent many strikes. 
2. The Impact of Private Actions on the Policy Favoring 
Collective Bargaining 
To the extent that private actions further the policies of the strike 
ban, they necessarily change the balance of bargaining strength be-
tween labor and management. The Supreme Courts of Michigan93 
and Washington94 have held that this modification of the balance of 
bargaining strength contravenes the policy in favor of collective bar-
gaining.95 The Washington Supreme Court reasoned that: 
[T]he delicate balance of labor relations is now primarily the province 
of the legislature, and ... the schemes created by statute for collective 
87. See Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 92 Wash. 
2d at 775, 600 P.2d at 1290; Harvard Note, supra note 81, at 1319-20. 
88. Rehmus, Constraints on Local Governments in Public Employee Bargaining, 67 MICH. L. 
REv. 919, 924 (1969) ("The financial constraints on local governments constitute the most 
serious problem they face in coping with public employee collective bargainings"). Even if the 
ultimate resource constraint is very high, so long as a constraint exists at some level all alloca-
tions to indemnification come at the expense of other union priorities. 
89. Harvard Note, supra note 81, at 1319 n.50. 
90. J. CALAMARI & J. P.ERRILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 262 (2d ed. 1973) ("[T]oday the 
general rule is that any wrongful act or threat which overcomes the free will of a party consti-
tutes duress.") (footnotes omitted). 
91. Compare City & County of San Francisco v. Cooper, 13 Cal. 3d 898,534 P.2d 403, 120 
Cal. Rptr. 707 (1975) (contract arrived at under pressure of illegal strike valid against com-
plaint of third-party private citizen), with Grasko v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 31 Cal. 
App. 3d 290, 107 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1973) (contract entered into under pressure of illegal strike is 
void because public policy disfavors contracts for illegal consideration). 
92. On the problematic nature of insurance against punitive damages, see W. PROSSER, 
LAW OF TORTS§ 2, at 12-13 (4th ed. 1971). 
93. Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fedn. of Teachers, 400 Mich. at 131,252 N.W.2d at 
830-31. 
94. Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 92 Wash. 2d 
762, 600 P.2d 1282. 
95. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 423.201-216 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 41.56.010-.960 
(1981). 
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bargaining and dispute resolution must be allowed to function as in-
tended, without the added coercive power of the courts being thrown 
into the balance on one side or the other.96 
Two assumptions lurk beneath this conclusion. The first is that the 
legislature intended that strikes play a role in determining the bal-
ance of bargaining power between governments and public employ-
ees.97 Private actions, therefore, are objectionable because they deter 
strikes and modify the bargaining balance. The second assumption is 
that private actions operate uniformly, in all bargaining situations, to 
create an identical perception of increased costs to unions contem-
plating illegal strikes. Neither assumption can withstand serious 
scrutiny. 
The very existence of the statutory strike ban suggests that the 
legislature did not intend that the strike threat influence the balance 
of bargaining strength. The imperative wording of these provisions, 
and the criminal sanctions often imposed for their violation, 
strengthens this impression.98 It seems anomalous to conclude that 
the legislature tacitly approved of, and desired to insulate from lia-
bility, conduct it found fit to outlaw.99 And although it is dangerous 
to inf er legislative intent from inaction, 100 the retention of the strike 
ban in most jurisdictions suggests that the proscription is intended to 
be more than hortatory in its operation. At a minimum, the logic 
that would lead to rejecting nonfrivolous private actions for strike-
inflicted damages because the defendants have long engaged in the 
illegal conduct that gives rise to the claim is questionable. 
One could object, however, that the legislature knew that unions 
would occasionally violate the strike ban.101 Thus, the possibility re-
mains that in establishing statutory penalties for violation of the 
strike ban the legislature merely aimed to define the cost of an illegal 
96. 92 Wash. 2d at 772, 600 P.2d at 1288. 
97. Harvard Note, supra note 81, at 1320. 
98. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.202 (1979) ("No person holding a position [gov-
erned by this act] ... shall strike."); N.Y. C1v. SERV. LAW§ 210.1 (McKinney) (1973) ("No 
public employee or employee organization shall engage in a strike, and no public employee or 
employee organization shall cause, instigate, encourage, or condone a strike."); WASH. REv. 
CODE§ 41.56.120 (1981) ("Nothing contained in this chapter shall permit or grant any public 
employee the right to strike or refuse to perform his official duties."). 
99. See Caso v. District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 162, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173, 176 (1973) 
("Read the way defendants suggest, the Taylor Law would become an impenetrable shield of 
immunity for public employees who may illegally cause serious damage to persons or parties 
other than their employer."). 
100. See generally H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making 
and Application of Law 1381-401 (1958) (unpublished manuscript). 
101. See Anderson, supra note 51, at 946-47 (The short history of unionism in the public 
sector demonstrates graphically that merely declaring public employee strikes illegal will pre-
vent neither collective bargaining from developing nor strikes from occurring."); Edwards, 
supra note 52, at 892 (1973) (''The threat or exercise of this de facto right to strike appears to 
be no less effective than the legalized right enjoyed by employees in the private sector."). 
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strike. This view conceives the strike ban as a legislatively imposed 
handicap that renders the strike option more expensive - but not 
beyond the pale - so as to achieve a definite balance between man-
agement and labor. 102 If valid, this view would harmonize the fear 
that an unfettered right to strike concedes public unions excessive 
political power with the suspicion that collective bargaining without 
the right to strike is a contradiction in terms. 
Unfortunately, the elegance of this argument falls before both the 
language and remedies of public employee statutes. These statutes 
do not provide that unions may strike as long as they are willing to 
pay a fee. Strike bans remain imperative; 103 it is, therefore, difficult 
to view the strike ban as a sort of tax that allows public employee 
strikes, but only under circumstances less favorable than those en-
joyed by employees in the private sector. 
A more direct response to the strike ban as tax argument would 
rely on the nature of the penalties associated with violations of no-
strike provisions. These provisions universally give public employ-
ers the right to equitable relief. 104 If the courts grant an injunction, 
and the union defies it, the magnitude of potential fines is unlimited. 
For this reason, it cannot be persuasively argued that the statutory 
remedy constitutes a delicate legislative balance in the nature of a 
tax. Private actions cannot upset the legislature's desired balance of 
bargaining strength in cases involving injunctions because the legis-
lature does not fix the fine that accrues for defiance of an 
injunction.105 
The second assumption essential to the conclusion that private 
actions will disrupt a legislatively established balance fares no better 
than the first. The assumption that private actions will operate in all 
circumstances to impose potentially catastrophic losses on unions 
and thereby alter the balance of bargaining power ignores the fact 
that private litigants will rarely sue when the public employer 
secures injunctive relief. 106 Private litigants have a significant incen-
tive to sue only when a powerful union emerges from an illegal strike 
with its resources shielded because the public employer has agreed to 
forgo statutory remedies. 107 Even if one grants the Washington 
102. See Edwards, supra note 52, at 892. This view also pervades Lamphere Schools and 
Burke & Thomas. 
103. See note 98 supra. 
104. See note 3 supra. 
105. Caso v. District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 162,350 N.Y.S.2d 173, 176-77 (App. Div. 
1973) ("[T]here is no limit on the amount the employee may be fined and there is no limit on 
the period that the union may be deprived of its 'dues check-off.' Since the Legislature appar-
ently found that fiscal constraints were appropriate to punish union transgressions, it does not 
seem that the form, whether fines or damages, is a controlling distinction."). 
106. See notes 83-84 supra. 
107. See note 82 supra. 
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court's assumption that the legislature 'intended to establish a de 
facto balance of bargaining strength by avoiding draconian no-strike 
sanctions, it seems unreasonable to assume further that the legisla-
ture intended that this balance shift in direct proportion to an ille-
gally striking union's ability to negotiate amnesty. Rather than 
distorting the bargaining balance ostensibly sought by the legisla-
ture, private actions may actually further the legislature's collective 
bargaining policies by ensuring some sanction against illegal strikes 
when political or economic realities vitiate statutory remedies. 108 
3. The Impact of Private Actions on Judicial Administration 
The final policy consideration that has concerned courts evaluat-
ing the propriety of private actions concerns judicial capacity to re-
solve the many private actions that might arise out of an illegal 
strike.109 This apprehension of "a labor law logjam in the courts"110 
should not deter the courts from considering such actions solely on 
their merits. The limited number of illegal strikes likely to lead to 
private actions, 111 and the possibility of consolidation, diminish the 
likelihood that courts will find these actions administratively bur-
densome. The history of the "logjam" argument suggests that few 
apologies for the status quo have been offered so often to avoid nec-
essary reforms for so little reason. 112 Since the apprehended tidal 
wave has yet to descend on jurisdictions that have recognized private 
actions, courts should not hesitate to dispense justice on the merits 
until such time as the burden of doing so exceeds the benefits. 
108. This points up an important distinction betwi:en actions by public employers and ac-
tions by private citizens. Employer actions of the sort presented to the court in Lamphere 
Schools depend on the prior balance of bargaining advantage. If the employer holds that 
advantage, the existing imbalance is aggravated by the addition of the damage action to the 
arsenal of management. By contrast, if the union can coerce management into not exercising 
its statutory or equitable remedies, it can also coerce management into forgoing the damage 
remedy. See Comment, supra note 49, at 293. In sharp contrast, a private damage remedy will 
only be invoked against a union with the bargaining advantage, since contempt fines would 
bankrupt the union if a speedy return to work did not render damages minimal. Consequently, 
private damage actions tend to serve the interest in balanced bargaining, operating counter to 
employer damage actions of the sort rejected in Lamphere Schools. This suggests that the 
reliance on Lamphere Schools in Burke & 'Inomas, which involved a private litigant's action, 
was misplaced. 
109. Lamphere, 400 Mich. at 131,252 N.W.2d at 830. The court also refers to this possibil-
ity as a "Pandora's box," 400 Mich. at 131, 252 N.W.2d at 831, predicting that "[v]arious 
public employers and public employees, as well as unions would take turns suing each other 
for tortious damages ad nauseum." 400 Mich. at 114 n.4, 252 N.W.2d at 823 n.4. 
110. 400 Mich. at 131,252 N.W.2d at 830. 
111. See Cole, supra note 2, at 316. 
112. See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, 153 Eng. Rep. 402,404 (1842) ("We ought not to 
permit a doubt to rest upon this subject for our doing so might be the means ofletting in upon 
us an infinity of actions."). The citadel has fallen, but the sky has not. 
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III. THEORIES OF RECOVERY 
If, as this Note argues, neither the legislature's language nor the 
policy judgment underlying public employee statutes precludes pri-
vate actions, courts should adjudicate such actions on the merits. 
Because courts have rejected causes of action implied from the statu-
tory strike ban113 and third-party contract.claims, 114 plaintiffs would 
be well advised to pursue other theories for imposing liability on 
illegally striking unions for strike-inflicted injury to private 
parties. 115 
A. Nuisance 
A public nuisance is defined as an "unreasonable interference 
with a right common to the general public."116 The interests pro-
tected under the nuisance rubric include public safety, health, and 
unobstructed travel over public rights of way. 117 These categories 
I 13. State courts have widely adopted the doctrine of causes of action "implied" from 
statutes. See, e.g., Falmouth Hosp. v. Lopes, 376 Mass. 580, 382 N.E.2d 1042, 1045-46 (1978); 
Manfredonia v. American Airlines, Inc., 68 A.D.2d 131, 139-40, 416 N.Y.S.2d, 291-92 (1979); 
Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 724-25, 588 P.2d ll05, ll 16 (1978) (Linde, J. dissenting); 
Gamm & Eisberg, The Implied Rights JJoctrine, 41 UMKC L. REV. 292, 294-95 & nn.7-12 
(1972). No court, however, has yet upheld a cause of action based on implication from a 
statutory strike ban. See Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fedn. of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 
128-29, 252 N.W.2d 818,829 (1977); Jamur Prod. Corp. v. Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 301,273 N.Y.S.2d 
348 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 92 
Wash. 2d 762, 770-77, 600 P.2d 1282, 1287-90 (1979) (en bane). 
There are several possible explanations for the failure of the implication theory. First, the 
universal co=on-law illegality of public employee strikes suggest that the purpose of the 
statutory strike bans was not to create the duty not to strike, but rather to define new methods 
of ensuring compliance with the duty that already existed. This in turn suggests that if the 
legislature chose not to include a damage remedy, it meant to imply none. Second, the public 
purpose of the strike ban statutes runs counter to the "special benefit" of the plaintiff's class 
test set out by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). Third, recent 
Supreme Court decisions have significantly narrowed the implication doctrine. See Trans-
america Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 
442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979). 
While some hope may linger for the implication theory, see Harvard Note, supra note 81, 
at 1312-20, these developments suggest that alternative theories may offer better chances to 
prospective plaintiffs. 
114. Third-party contract claims have been rejected for lack of the parties' manifest intent 
to benefit plaintiffs. See Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Linder, 108 Misc. 2d 458, 
475-76, 437 N.Y.S.2d 895, 908 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Jamur Prod. Corp. v. Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 501, 
507, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348, 353-54 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
115. This is not to say, however, that the previously rejected theories are unsupported by 
reasonable arguments. See Harvard Note, supra note 81, at 1312-20, 1321-27. 
ll6. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 821B(l) (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971). This broad 
definition fairly exemplifies the standard applied by the courts. See, e.g., Potomac River Assn. 
v. Lundenberg Maryland Seamanship School, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 344, 358 (D. Md. 1975); 
Ozark Poultry Prods. v. Garman, 251 Ark. 389, 390-91, 472 S.W.2d 714, 716 (1971); Robie v. 
Lillis, 112 N.H. 492, 495, 299 A.2d 155, 158 (1972). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 92, 
§ 88. 
117. Offenses against these interests were originally viewed as co=on law crimes, and 
nuisance would not lie unless the criminal law also proscribed the alleged nuisance. Every 
American state has long since adopted an omnibus penal nuisance statute, however, and 
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dovetail nicely with the interests jeopardized by the interruption of 
public services. Additionally, because it does not generally matter 
how the interferences with such interests arose, 118 nuisance offers a 
plausible theory for imposing liability on illegally striking public 
unions. 
Perhaps more importantly, public sector strikes imperil public 
rights to a greater extent than do classic nuisances. The risk posed 
by a firefighters' strike far outstrips the risk posed by the fire hazards 
of garbage dumps and old buildings - both well established public 
nuisances.119 Similarly, striking transit workers frustrate public 
travel to an extent that the classic prupesture never could.120 And 
strikes by sanitation workers affect public health and comfort far 
more than does a property owner who fails to dispose properly of 
garbage or maintain the integrity of a cesspool, failures that consti-
tute public nuisances at common law.121 
Although an interference with public rights will not constitute a 
nuisance if it amounts to a reasonable intrusion on the public inter-
est, 122 the argument that illegal strikes properly fall within this ex-
ception lacks merit. The well-established policies underlying both 
statutory and common-law strike bans123 foreclose public unions 
"[s]uch statutes are co=only construed to include anything which would have been a public 
nuisance at co=on law." W. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 88, at 596. Statutory considerations 
consequently do not alter the analysis presented here in co=on-law terms. See, e.g., Duncan 
v. City of Tuscaloosa, 257 Ala. 574, 577-78, 60 So. 2d 438, 440 (1952); City of Chicago v. 
Geraci, 30 Ill. App. 3d 699, 702, 332 N.E.2d 487, 490 (1975); Co=onwealth v. MacDonald, 
464 Pa. 435, 453-56, 347 A.2d 290, 300-01 (1975). 
The cases speak of the rights protected by nuisance, and the manner in which a nuisance 
may arise, quite broadly. "[A) public nuisance is the doing of or the failure to do s_omething 
that injuriously affects the safety, health, or morals of the public, or works some substantial 
annoyance, inconvenience, or injury to the public ...• " Co=onwealth v. South Covington 
& C. St. Ry., 181 Ky. 459, 463, 205 S.W. 581, 583 (1918). Many courts have approved this 
language. Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 
355 (1971); Echave v. City of Grand Junction, 118 Colo. 165, 170, 193 P.2d 277,280 (1948) (en 
bane); Abbott v. City of Des Moines, 230 Iowa 494, 503, 298 N.W. 649, 653 (1941); Copart 
Indus. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 41 N.Y.2d 564, 568, 362 N.E.2d 968, 971, 394 
. N.Y.S.2d 169, 172 (1977). 
118. Note the act or omission standard adopted by the cases set out in note 117, supra. 
Prosser elucidates: Nuisance "is a field of tort liability, rather than a type of tortious conduct. 
It has reference to the interest invaded, to the damage or harm inflicted, and not to any partic-
ular kind of act or omission which has led to the invasion." W. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 87, 
at 573. 
119. See, e.g., People v. Oliver, 816 Cal. App. 2d 885, 195 P.2d 926 (1948); State ex rel. 
Brown v. Armstrong, 206 Okla. 145,241 P.2d 959 (1952); City ofSpokanev. Carlson, 73 Wash. 
2d 76, 436 P.2d 545 (1968) (en bane). 
120. See, e.g., Adams v. Commissioners of Trappe, 204 Md. 165, 102 A.2d 830 (1954); 
Sloan v. City of Greenville, 235 S.C. 277, 111 S.E.2d 573 (1959); James v. Hayward, 79 Eng. 
Rep. 761 (K.B. 1631). 
121. See Kem v. Myll, 80 Mich. 525, 45 N.W. 587 (1890); Harrington v. Board of Alder-
men, 20 R.I. 233, 38 A. l (1897); Trevett v. Prison Assn. of Va, 98 Va. 332, 36 S.E. 373 (1900). 
122. W. PROSSER, supra note 92, §87 at 581. 
123. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2). 
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from asserting successfully that their interruption of vital services 
serves the public interest. Precedent establishing that private labor 
activity, conducted illegally, can constitute a public nuisance, 124 also 
undercuts argument along these lines. 
Public sector strikes thus manifest the necessary elements of a 
common-law nuisance. And although the case law is sparse, no 
court that has reached the merits of the claim has rejected a public 
nuisance theory of liability as applied to a public employee strike. 125 
The interests that have been recognized in the limited case law on 
point include the interest in safety threatened by a firefighters' 
strike, 126 the interest in health threatened by a sanitation workers' 
strike, 127 and the interest in public convenience threatened by a 
transit strike. 128 The breadth of the public nuisance theory and the 
variety of specific nuisances successfully assailed in cases brought 
against private defendants129 suggests that future plaintiffs may well 
succeed in adding to the list of interests enumerated above. 
A potential difficulty facing private plaintiffs who pursue a nui-
sance theory involves the traditional requirement of "special dam-
ages" different in kind, and not merely in degree, from those suffered 
by the public generally.130 In the absence of such proof, only a des-
ignated public officer is entitled to seek redress for a purely public 
124. Courts have held, both before and after the enactment of the National Labor Rela• 
tions Act, that picketing, pursuant to a strike, that involves intimidation or violence may be a 
public nuisance. See United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 61 (1959) (per curiam) 
(Harlan & Frankfurter, JJ., concurring); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895): Sherry v. Perkins, 
147 Mass. 212, 17 N.E. 307 (1888); F.C. Church Co. v. Turner, 218 Mo. App. 516,279 S.W. 232 
(1926). 
125. Plaintiffs did not plead nuisance in Lamphere Schools, or Burke & Thomas. In City 
of Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale, & Dept. Store Union, 1979-80 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 
37,157 (W. Va. 1980), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals rejected any common law 
liability for a peaceful public employee strike in an action where plaintiffs pleaded nuisance. 
This result, however, depended not on any appraisal of the merits of the nuisance claim, but 
instead flowed from the court's broader conclusion to exercise judicial restraint by "adopt[ing] 
the view of the Michigan Supreme Court in Lamphere . ••. " The fact that West Virginia has 
no legislative enactment of any sort relating to public employee labor relations casts-doubt on 
the soundness of the Fairmont court's reasoning. 
126. Fulenwider v. Firefighters (IAFF) Local 1784, 1979-81 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 
~ 36,956 (Tenn. App. June 2, 1980). 
127. Caso v. District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1973). 
128. Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 108 Misc. 2d 458, 472, 437 
N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. 1981). 
129. W. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 88, at 583-84, notes the following examples culled from 
the cases: hogpens, storing explosives, keeping diseased animals, a malarial pond, detonating 
fireworks, keeping a vicious dog, practicing medicine without a license, brothels, speakeasies, 
indecent exhibitions, bullfights, unlicensed prize fights, public profanity, noises, odors, smoke, 
dust, vibrations, obstructions of highways and waterways, and disorderly crowds, among 
others. Turning the community's children away from the schoolhouse and into the streets 
seems an annoyance at least equivalent to some of these, although damages would be highly 
speculative. 
130. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 821C(l); Prosser, Private Action far a Public 
Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997, 997 (1966). 
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wrong.131 The fact that "special" damages need not be unique132 
may somewhat alleviate this difficulty. Where a sanitation strike in-
jures the public interest in clean waterways, but raw sewage befouls 
an individual's waterfront, 133 or where a firefighters' strike jeopar-
dizes public safety generally, but an individual's home actually 
burns, 134 it would not be difficult to make out a claim of "special" 
damages. 
In fact, at least one jurisdiction has taken a fairly expansive view 
of what will satisfy the "special" damages requirement.135 In Burns 
Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Linder, a lower court held that 
plaintiffs may recover mere "pecuniary losses" as "special" dam-
ages.136 Burns involved a claim by business and professional em-
ployees that a New York transit strike hampered their ability to 
carry on their business activities. The court articulated a distinction 
between damages resulting from increased "out-of-pocket ·expenses 
incurred merely to carry on their professional practices . . . in the 
face of an illegal strike" and "lost profits" occasioned by the incon-
venience of disrupted daily routines. 137 The latter were considered 
damages suffered in common with the public at large, but the former 
were deemed recoverable pecuniary losses. . 
Although the approach in Burns can be faulted in several partic-
ulars, 138 the sufficiency of pecuniary losses to satisfy the special dam-
ages requirement reflects the prevailing rule.139 Courts should 
probably retain enough of the special damages requirement to deny 
recovery in cases where plaintiffs cannot demonstrate financial loss 
convincingly. But losses definite enough to withstand rigorous chal-
lenge and large enough to justify the expense of litigation cannot 
131. Prosser, supra note 130, at 1005-07. 
132. Prosser, supra note 130, at 1008-09. 
133. Caso v. District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1973). 
134. This is the Fulenwider situation. The general loss will express itself as an increase in 
insurance premiums. 
135. Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer, 108 Misc. 2d 458 (Sup. Ct. 1981) 
136. 108 Misc. 2d at 473-75. 
137. 108 Misc. 2d at 475. 
138. The court's comprehensive view of special damages may disserve the policies behind 
the special damages requirement, see REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,§ 821C, Comment a 
(''The reasons usually given for the rule are that it is essential to relieve the defendant of the 
multiplicity of actions that might follow if everyone were free to sue for the common wrong; 
and that any harm or interference shared by the public at large will normally be, if not entirely 
theoretical or potential, at least minor, petty and trivial so far as the individual is concerned."), 
dissipate on trivial claims the resources available for compensation, and produce the anomaly 
whereby those able to afford alternative private services during the strike will recover their 
"pecuniary losses," while those who cannot afford such substitutes, and thus suffer most from 
the strike, will find their damages "common to the public at large" and not recoverable. 
139. REsTATEMENT (SECOND} OF TORTS,§ 821C, Comment h; Prosser, supra note 130, at 
1009 ("It is only when the class becomes so large and general as to include all members of the 
public who come in contact with the nuisance, that the private action will fail"). 
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easily be dismissed as trivial. To the extent that the "special" dam-
ages requirement might foreclose recovery in cases where several 
plaintiffs suffer substantial injury, pecuniary or otherwise, the liberal 
approach taken by the Burns court seems advisable. 
B. Negligence 
An articulable duty to the plaintiff, breached by a failure to ob-
serve due care, proximate cause, and actual damages, is the classic 
litany of actionable negligence.140 The hombook definition of negli-
gent conduct is "conduct which falls below the standard established 
by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of 
harm."141 One could argue that a public union is negligent when it 
engages in an illegal strike when a reasonable man would foresee 
unreasonable risks to the public, and the strike in fact inflicts dam-
ages such as those foreseen. 142 
l. .Duty 
The steadfast refusal of courts to recognize any duty - on the 
part of either public employers or employees - to provide individ-
ual citizens with vital public services presents the chief difficulty con-
fronting plaintiffs under a negligence theory. As a general 
140. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 30, at 143. Contemporary tort theory and its 
discontents play little role in the discussion to follow. Insofar as modem tort theory favors 
locating liability with the least cost damage avoider (within parameters set by a visceral sense 
of justice), it favors the causes of action advocated here. For while the municipal employer 
can avoid the strike by acceding to union demands, the cost of damage avoidance then in-
cludes the cost of those demands. Beyond this, the intricate comparison of negligence and strict 
liability as alternate regimes for de.fining tort liability seems premature in the public sector 
strike context, as no court has yet held a union that illegally strikes against a public employer 
liable in simple negligence. See G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970); w. BLUM & 
H. KAI.VEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM (1965); R. EPSTEIN, 
MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (1980); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 
1977); Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay far Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. 
CHI. L. Rev. 69 (1975); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tori Theory, 85 HARV. L. Rev. 537 
(1972); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). A recent critical review of 
this work is Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modem Tort Theory, 9 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 27 (1980). 
141. W. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 87 at 581. 
142. The prevailing approach views the risks of a defendant's conduct that a reasonable 
man would foresee as de.fining the scope of duty and the limits of proximate cause. See, e.g., 
Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181, 188, 418 P.2d 278, 285 (1966) ("Every person has a general 
duty to use due or ordinary care not to injure others •.• " and "(t)he degree of care to be 
exercised must be commensurate with the danger or hazard connected with the activity.") 
(citations omitted); Harper v. Epstein, 16 Ill. App. 3d 771, 772-73, 306 N.E.2d 690, 691 (1974) 
("[A) person owes to all others the duty of exercising care to guard against injury which may 
naturally flow as a reasonably probable and foreseeable consequence of this action.") (citations 
omitted); Mang v. Eliassen, 153 Mont. 431, 437, 458 P.2d 777, 781 (1969) ("defendant owes a 
duty with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably 
dangerous, and hence negligent in the first instance."); Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. 248 N.Y. 
339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928) (''The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be 
obeyed."). 
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proposition, substantial policy considerations support this refusal. 
As applied to illegal strikes, however, it has the anomalous effect of 
shielding unions from liability for concededly illegal conduct that 
makes severe harm to some individuals a virtual certainty. Pals-
grq/143 long ago established that the elements of negligence do not 
exist in isolation and that courts cannot properly assess one element 
without considering the others.144 A frank appraisal of the motiva-
tion behind illegal strikes, their likely effect, and the injustice of de-
nying recovery when the risks posed by public strikes devolve with 
crushing force on individual plaintiffs argues for resolving the duty 
question against unions that engage in illegal strikes. 
The traditional approach is typified by a recent decision of the 
Tennessee Court of Appeals, which rejected a negligence claim 
against an illegally striking firefighter's union because it found no 
duty running from the firefighters to the plaintiff.145 The court relied 
on two earlier decisions146 holding that a city does not incur negli-
gence liability for failing to provide fire protection or for injuries 
resulting from the operation of its firetrucks. From these decisions, 
the court apparently reasoned that because the state owes no duty to 
provide services, unions cannot be liable for interruption of whatever 
services the state chooses to provide. This line of reasoning -
equating illegal strikes with a passive failure to provide services that 
citizens do not enjoy as a matter of right - mires the negligence 
analysis in the tortuous distinctions that separate an undertaking 
from a duty, misfeasance from nonfeasance, and the good samaritan 
rule from the "limited duty'' to act affirmatively.147 
143. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
144. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.2 (1956). Under the prevailing 
view 
inquiry is made into why the particular act or omission complained of was negligent. This 
will be because the offending conduct foreseeably involved unreasonably great risk of 
harm to the interests of someone other than the actor. This view would limit the scope of 
the duty accordingly: the obligation to refrain from that particular conduct is owed only 
to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect to those 
risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous. Duty, in 
other words, is measured by the scope of the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably 
entails. 
(Emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). Id. at 1018. 
145. Fulenwilder v. Firefighters (IAFF) Local 1784, 1979-81 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 
~ 36,956, at 37,757 (Tenn. App. June 2, 1980) ("We know ofno duty imposed upon a firemen's 
union to furnish adequate fire protection to an individual property owner and we have no incli-
nation to now create such a duty.") (emphasis in original). 
146. Burnett v. Rudd, 165 Tenn. 238, 54 S.W.2d 718 (1932); Irvine v. Chattanooga, 101 
Tenn. 291, 47 S.W. 419 (1898). 
147. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 314,323; Harvard Note, supra note 
81, at 1323-26, and cases cited therein; see also Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 500 
(9th Cir. 1975); Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973). Such distinctions are not 
simplified by the semantic fact that any action can be described in negative terms, such that 
doing nothing amounts to the failure to do something, and doing something amounts to the 
failure to do nothing. 
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If one focuses on the strike-related conduct of public unions sued 
in a private action, however, an illegal strike involves more than a 
mere passive decision not to undertake the provision of public serv-
ices. A strike demands substantial, concerted organizational effort to 
succeed; a strike vote must be called, and the result must be commu-
nicated to the membership. When public unions strike, they do not 
intend to terminate their employment - they seek only to interrupt 
services long enough to secure their demands. To this end, unions 
must continuously coordinate the conduct of the strike with their ne-
gotiating position.148 This sort of behavior does not signal a passive 
refusal to provide gratuitous services. 
The duty question takes on a different appearance when viewed 
from this perspective. The issue is not whether government owes 
private citizens a duty to provide services, but whether public em-
ployee unions owe a duty not to interfere with the services that gov-
ernment chooses to provide. Courts have consistently upheld such a 
duty in related contexts. A railroad company whose train severs a 
firehose, 149 or delays firemen at a crossing150 incurs negligence liabil-
ity to a plaintiff whose building bums. When the railroad's employ-
ees had reason to know that they must exercise due care to avoid 
interfering with fire protection, 151 "interference with the rights of the 
public to fire protection violates a fundamental social duty and is a 
common law tort." 152 Similarly, although it is generally held that 
citizens enjoy no right to use public roads, 153 contractors or property 
owners adjacent to the roadway owe a duty not to endanger pass-
ersby through negligent behavior. 154 Analogizing illegally striking 
148. These distinctions suffice to differentiate antistrike regulations from constitutionally 
impermissible involuntary servitude. Anderson, supra note 51, at 948-49 (1969) ("Moreover, 
restrictions on concerted work stoppages do not raise an issue of involuntary servitude. The 
courts have always interpreted the constitutional provisions on involuntary servitude as run-
ning to the individual; they have never found that these provisions extend so far as to create a 
collective right to terminate employment." (citing Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926))). 
149. Kahn v. Southern Ry., 202 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1953) (obstructing crossing); Delaware 
& H.R.R. v. Felter, 98 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1938) (obstructing crossing); Little Rock Traction & 
Elec. Co. v. McCaskill, 75 Ark. 133, 86 S.W. 997 (1905); Erickson v. Great N. Ry., 117 Minn. 
348, 135 N.W. 1129 (1912); Cottonwood Fibre Co. v. Thompson, 359 Mo. 1062, 225 S.W.2d 
702 (1949) (delaying firefighters at crossing); Phenix Ins. Co. v. New York Cent. & H.R.R.R., 
122 A.D. 111, 106 N.Y.S. 696 (1907), qff'd., 196 N.Y. 554, 90 N.E. 1164 (1909). 
150. See Louisville N.R.R. v. Duncan, 16 Ala. App. 520, 79 So. 513 (1918); Cottonwood 
Fibre Co. v. Thompson, 359 Mo. 1062, 225 S.W.2d at 706 (1949); Luedeke v. Chicago & N.W. 
Ry., 120 Neb. 124,231 N.W. 695 (1930). 
151. Cottonwood Fibre Co. v. Thompson, 359 Mo. at 1067, 225 S.W.2d at 706 (1949). 
152. Cottonwood Fibre Co. v. Thompson, 359 Mo. at 1067, 225 S.W.2d at 705 (1949). 
153. See, e.g., Sueppel v. Eads, 261 Iowa 923, 928, 156 N.W.2d Il5, II8 (1968) ("Permis-
sion to .pperate a motor vehicle upon the public highways is not embraced within the term 
'civil rights' and is in the nature of a license or privilege.") (citation omitted); Agree v. Kansas 
Highway Commn. Motor Vehicle Dept., 198 Kan. 173, 180, 422 P.2d 949, 955 (1967) ("It is 
established law that the right to operate a motor vehicle upon public streets and highways is 
not a natural right, but a privilege, subject to reasonable regulation in the public interest."). 
154. Cullman-Jefferson Counties Gas Dist. v. Reeves, 281 Ala. 67, 69, 199 So. 2d 78, 80 
May 1982) Note - Public Union Strikes 1299 
public employees to private citizens who negligently interfere with 
the delivery of vital services is more precise than equating them with 
a sovereign who has no duty to provide services. 
2. Failure To Observe .Due Care 
In direct contrast to the duty question, the inquiry into whether 
due care was observed presents an ordinary factual question. The 
formula generally applied to test a defendant's conduct against the 
due care standard requires that the utility of that conduct exceed its 
risk. 155 The legislature's judgment, as expressed in public employee 
statutes containing no-strike provisions, that the policy of collective 
bargaining does not justify granting the strike weapon creates at least 
a rebuttable presumption on the utility-risk issue. And if courts ac-
cord the contemporary justification for the strike ban any weight, 156 
benefits to the union from an illegal strike are likely to be found 
dwarfed by the risks that such strikes pose. Once courts recognize a 
duty of due care to those endangered by the disruption of govern-
ment services, the negligence of a public employee strike is a conclu-
sion not easily avoided. 157 
(1967) (''We are unimpressed with the appellant's argument to the effect that the Gas Com-
pany had no duty to maintain the road and that that responsibility rested with the State or the 
municipal authorities. We have long been committed to the proposition that one using a pub-
lic way for its own purposes, even with permission, must use due care to avoid injury to the 
traveling public."); Haragan v. American Fedn. of Grain Millers, 445 S.W.2d 131 (Ky. 1969) 
(union pickets on highway shoulder may constitute negligence); Best v. Fred Weber Constr. 
Co., 525 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Moore v. Geiger, 6 Ohio App. 2d 14, 215 N.E.2d 607 
(1966). 
155. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965). 
156. See notes 74-130 supra and accompanying text. 
157. Two lines of precedent in the New York State courts reinforce this conclusion. In 
Caso v. District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1973) and Burns Jackson Miller 
Summit & Spitzer v. Linder, 108 Misc. 2d 458 (1981), prima facie tort actions for damages 
resulting from illegal strikes were upheld. This doctrine makes "actionable an intentional 
wrong that [does) not classify into any of the formal categories" of tort law. 108 Misc. 2d at 
465. The doctrine is justified on the ground that "[p]rima facie, the intentional infliction of 
temporal damage is a cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive law, whatever may be 
the form of pleading, requires a justification if the defendant is to escape," 108 Misc. 2d at 465, 
quoting Holmes, J., in Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904). The sweeping terminology 
employed by the .Burns court begs the question of what constitutes an "intentional wrong," 
especially when the analysis is, by hypothesis, divorced from the formal categories which de-
fine tort law. See W. PROSSER, supra note 92 at 4. ("[E]ven with allowance made for the 
difficulty of wording it, the rules does not tell us what the law will recognize as 'harm' to 
another, or as '.justification' for it."). But these cases do suggest that even when the negligence 
analysis concerning utility of conduct and liability proceeds less formally, that analysis results 
in finding illegal strikes tortious. 
Of closer relevance to negligence, the court in People v. Vizzini, 78 Misc. 2d 1042, 359 
N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1974), upheld the validity of indictments that charged leaders of a 
firefighters' local that illegally struck with criminal reckless endangerment, pursuant to N.Y. 
PENAL LAW§§ 120.20, 145.25 (McKinney 1975). lfa union's leaders incur criminal reckless-
ness by conducting an illegal strike, courts should, a fortiori, find it possible to impose civil 
liability for simple negligence. While Vizzini involved allegations that the defendants fraudu-
lently reported the results of the union strike vote, the magnitude of the risk posed by a strike 
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Because illegal strikes exert pressure on public management 
through the medium of damage to the public158 proximate cause 
would not appear to present a difficult issue for plaintiffs able to es-
tablish cause-in-fact. Government employers, of course, do not op-
erate for a profit and may even save money during a strike. 159 The 
union enjoys bargaining leverage during a work stoppage precisely 
because the immediate, primary, and foreseeable result of illegal 
strikes is damage to the public. 
Causation-in-fact may present a closer issue in many cases. 
While a police strike may lead to a demonstrable and perhaps dra-
matic crime wave, any particular citizen victimized during the strike 
may not be able to link the injury conclusively to the strike. 16° Fire 
destroys many buildings even when the fire department actively 
does not depend on the process of decislon that led the union to engage in it. Negligence is 
conduct, not a state of mind. See W. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 31 at 145; Terry, Negligence, 
29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915). Vizzini therefore stands for the proposition that certain public 
employee strikes create risks that considerably exceed those sufficient to amount to civil 
negligence. 
158. The court in Jamur Prods. Corp. v. Quill, SI Misc. 2d SOI, 509,273 N.Y.S.2d 348,355 
(Sup. Ct. 1966) dismissed causes of action for nuisance and prima facie tort later upheld in 
New York courts because the damages complained of were "too remote" to allow recovery. 
The court cited United Mine Workers v. Osborne, 279 F.2d 716, 729 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. 
denied, 364 U.S. 881 (1960), as authority for this proposition. SJ Misc.2d at 507,273 N.Y.S.2d 
at 354. Osborne involved a suit against a union for an illegal strike by a sales agent of the 
employer. The court found that the economic losses to third parties imposed by a strike were 
too remote to permit recovery. 
This authority ignores the distinction, now recognized by the New York courts, between 
public and private sector strikes. Private sector unions exert pressure on management during a 
strike by shutting down production, thus reducing sales and, ultimately, profits. But a govern-
ment employer does not operate for profit. The only way the public union's strike exerts pres-
sure on the employer is by inflicting damage on the public. As the court observed in Caso v. 
District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 163, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173, 177 (1973): "The assumption in 
Jamur that the risk of damage in the subway strike was unforeseeable should be rejected, since 
it is the very inevitability of extensive damages which led to the prohibition of public strikes." 
Because the union calculates its bargaining leverage in terms of its capacity to inflict damage 
on the public - the strike having no other impact on the employer, typically - damage 
caused in fact by public employee strikes will nearly always deserve classification as 
"proximate." 
159. Education furnishes an excellent example' of an expensive service provided without a 
user charge to the public. The educational system does not expend its funds during the dura-
tion of the strike, and hence amasses a subsidy it would normally expend on education, The 
pressure on the school board to settle therefore partakes of no financial concerns at all, but 
exclusively of the political pressures brought to bear through the infliction of damage on the 
public. 
160. See Maidlow v. City of Toledo, 921 Govt. Empl. Rel. Rep. 18, 1981-83 Pub. Bargain-
ing Cas. (CCH) ~ 37,321 (Ohio Court of Common Pleas (1981). Plaintiffs' decedent was a bus 
driver killed during a robbery that occurred while the police were on strike. The City of 
Toledo escaped liability as a result of sovereign immunity. The defendant unions also pre-
vailed on motions to dismiss, but neither service report makes clear on what grounds. The fact 
situtation, however, admirably points up the "cause in fact" problem that may arise in such 
circumstances. 
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seeks to prevent this result, and this diminishes the likelihood that 
fire losses during a strike would not have occurred but for the strike. 
Several considerations minimize these difficulties. First, in many 
cases the causation question will not prove difficult. In one case, for 
example, the court had no difficulty concluding that ''but for'' the 
sanitation strike, plaintifrs beaches would not have been drenched 
with sewage.161 Second, in cases where the causation issue proves 
more difficult, there is no reason to suppose that the trier of fact will 
falter. American law typically requires both judge and jury to make 
difficult causation judgments.162 The final consideration that under-
cuts any objection to private actions premised on the difficulty of 
cause-in-fact is the satisfactory resolution of far more difficult causa-
tion questions in other contexts.163 An example is the innovative ap-
plication of probability analysis to class-action damage awards. 164 
Regardless of how troublesome cause-in-fact questions might be in 
specific cases, litigants deserve at least an opportunity to present 
their evidence to the trier of fact. 
4. Damages 
If private actions are allowed against public unions, the primary 
issue will then be whether a union will have the resources necessary 
to compensate all potential plaintiffs. A union, possibly impover-
ished by contempt fines, will rarely have assets that even approxi-
mate the size of potential damage awards. This imbalance may lead 
to great difficulty in fairly compensating the entire plaintiff class be-
cause no individual is likely to receive more than a small fraction of 
his actual damages. 
This problem does,not justify refusing to recognize private ac-
tions. Each plaintiff slfould be free to decide whether the potential 
recovery makes litigation worthwhile, either individually or as a 
member of a class. Furthermore, privat~ litigation will rarely be ini-
tiated except against a union possessing significant resources.165 
And, as between tortfeasors and their victims, even partial compen-
161. 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1973). 
162. Jurors often weigh the credibility of two witnesses with completely contradictory ac-
counts, or assign fault in unwitnessed double fatality automobile accidents. Such judgments 
are at least as ineluctable as the causation problems presented by damage actions premised 
upon illegal strikes. 
163. One example is the challenge posed by the introduction of epidemiological evidence. 
See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal Rptr. 132 (1980); Abel 
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1980). 
164. Such an approach in a public union strike case would measure the difference in casu-
alties attributable to the strike, and assign each casualty victim for the strike period damages 
equal to her actual loss multiplied by the probability that but for the strike she would have 
escaped injury. See note 163, supra. 
165. See the policy analysis developed in note 107 and accompanying text. 
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sation serves the fundamental policy of tort law. 166 Plaintiffs deserve 
at least the option of pursuing partial compensation. 
CONCLUSION 
The absence of legislative intent to prohibit private remedies 
through the enactment of public sector labor legislation suggests that 
common-law tort principles should define the scope of union liability 
for illegal strikes. Nuisance and negligence offer two possibilities for 
defining such liability. In the judicious application of these familiar 
principles, rather than in speculation concerning ineluctable legisla-
tive purposes, lies the proper role of courts adjudicating private dam-
age actions against public sector unions for illegal strikes. 
166. W. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 2, at 7 (the tort action's "purpose is to compensate him 
[the victim] for the damage he has suffered at the expense of the wrongdoer."). Most victims 
probably would prefer partial compensation to none at all. And the deterrent effect of private 
actions, even if motivated by a lust for attorneys' fees, serves the public policies underlymg the 
strike ban. See notes 81-92 supra. 
